

PONTIFICIA UNIVERSITAS LATERANENSIS

ACADEMIA ALFONSIANA

INSTITUTUM SUPERIUS THEOLOGIAE MORALIS

# STUDIA MORALIA

VII

1969

CONTRIBUTIONES AD PROBLEMA SPEI

DESLÉE & SOCII - EDITORES PONTIFICII

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*Imprimi potest*

Romae, ad Sancti Alfonsi,  
die 13 decembris 1969

A. AMARAL C.ss.R.

TARCISIO ARIIOVALDO AMARAL C.ss.R.

Superior Generalis

*Imprimatur*

Curia Archiepiscopalis Perusina

Perusiae, december 1969

DOMINICUS DOTTORINI, Vic. Gen.

# I N D E X

## CONTRIBUTIONES AD PROBLEMA SPEI

HÄRING B., Das christliche Leben im Zeichen der Hoffnung . . . . .	7-31
O'RIORDAN S., The psychology of Hope . . . . .	33-55
CAPONE D., Cristo: speranza teologica dell'uomo . . . .	57-117
MURPHY F.X., Hope: its revolutionary aspect in Patristic Thought . . . . .	119-129
FRIES A., Hoffnung und heilsgewissheit bei Thomas von Aquino . . . . .	131-236
DINGJAN F., Christliche Hoffnung in einer weltlichen Welt nach « Gaudium et Spes » . . . . .	237-263
BOELAARS H., La « Teologia della speranza » di Jürgen Moltmann . . . . .	265-305
ENDRES J., Die Hoffnung bei Ernst Bloch . . . . .	307-330
SAMPERS A., Academiae Alfonsianae chronica anni academici 1968-69 . . . . .	331-339

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*Socii Redactionis*

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## THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HOPE

### SUMMARIUM

1. In quantum est thema speciale vitae humanae psychicae spes plerumque negligitur et pratermittitur in formis usitatis psychologiae empiricae. Paulum de ea reperitur in psychologia physiologica vel behavioristica, paulum quoque in psychologia profunditatum, quamvis summum momentum spei in quantum est vis motrix semper et ubique actiosa in tota vita humana evidentissimum sit. Spes enim informat et insignit omnem operationem humanam quae ad aliquem finem dirigitur: inseparabilis est ab *intentionalitate* vitae humanae in qualicumque sphaera.

2. Ratio huius neglectus spei in psychologia empirica in eo invenitur quod spes est activitas psychica *sine obiecto existente* sed tantum possibili. Methodologia autem usitata psychologiae empiricae postulat *existentiam obiecti* alicuius activitatis psychicae ut haec activitas *concrete* in relatione cum suo obiecto *concreto* indagetur. Deficiente tali obiecto, ut in phenomeno spei deficit, psychologus empiricus videtur carere *materia* scientiae suae et proinde thema spei cedit formis 'poeticis' cogitationis humanae.

3. Attamen in psychologia empirica recentiori phenomenon spei accipitur et investigatur *prout est* ac novae methodi elaborantur ad eam (et alia themata 'existentialia' vitae humanae) explorandam. Relatio spei ad *obiectum non-exsistens* sed *capax existentiae* 'futuritatem' eius constituit. 'Futuritas' est qualitas specifica spei humanae. Spes ad 'futurum' necessario *tendit* sed numquam 'futurum' *possidet*. Si spes impletur, ita ut obiectum eius in possessionem sperantis transeat, spes cessat in contextu *huius* obiecti: sed mox haec ipsa impletio spei cessat, quia impulsus spei tunc ad nova obiecta se transfert et nova 'futura' gignit versus quae trahitur homo viator. Vel potius 'futurum' est dimensio ineluctabilis vitae humanae quae spem humanam indefesse excitat et quodammodo *creat*. Spes et 'futurum' indissolubiliter inter se coniunguntur.

4. Psychologia 'existentialis' phenomeni spei est quidem vera et profunda sed semper requirit adiumentum aliarum formarum psychologiae empiricae, illarum scilicet quae *praesens* humanum investigant. 'Futurum' enim *ex* praesenti proiicitur, et in sana relatione cum praesenti consistere debet ut 'futurum' vere humanum sit. 'Futurum' a praesenti *alienatum* est chimaericum, furiam, non veram spem, humanam excitans, ut historia testatur. Methodus igitur 'existentialis' non sufficit ad phenomenon spei integre explorandum. Investigandum est etiam *id quod est* ut solide investigari possit *id quod venturum est*, uti speramus.

5. Momentum psychologiae empiricae *thematicae spei humanae* relate ad *theologiam spei* sic adumbrari potest:

a) Psychologia empirica illuminat *omne quod humanum et personale est* in spe theologi;

b) Confirmat *humanitatem* 'futuri' quod in Novo Testamento nobis promittitur sed *inhumanitatis* taxat 'futurum' quod in tractatibus post-scholasticis *De Novissimis* delineatur;

c) Demonstrat necessitatem theologiam 'futuri' *nove* sed *solide* construendi.

## I.

As a specific theme of human psychological life hope has been strangely neglected. At the behavioural level of life, even if we take this in its most rigidly quantitative and measurable sense, hope is the determinant of a vast range of human activities, individual and social. Every activity in fact that is characterised by the pursuit of a goal to be attained as part of the process of living may, psychologically, be categorised as hopeful. Thus human speech is hopeful because it is effected in pursuit of the goal of communication between men. A question expects an answer: a statement expects assent or dissent, explicit or implicit. The speaker literally *hopes* for a response *out of* the situation of communication in which he places himself in regard to other men by the very act of speaking.

Similarly, all economic activity from the most primitive to the most technological is goal-directed, purposive and therefore hopeful. The primitive hunter hunts in hope of game; the modern manufacturer produces in hope of sales. Economic hope is not a mere emotional adjunct to or concomitant of a form of activity identifiable and analysable as economic independently of the hope-factor which is present in it. It is the specific hope-factor itself

which is present in economic situations that *makes* them economic, 'house-managing' activities. Hope *creates* economy, sustains and develops it, and directs it to the hoped-for goal that existed as idea and purpose before the economic process started and without which it never would have started since hope was from the start its sole determinant.

Again we note the specific and specifying hope-factor in human sexual activity, whatever particular form it takes. It is *purposive* activity, reaching out to individual or social goals or both and not patient of any adequate scientific description or analysis in isolation from the hope that characterises and animates it.

These are only some examples of the behavioural impact of hope on human life — to confine ourselves to that aspect of it for the moment. The list of behavioural hope-factors in life could be almost indefinitely extended. Yet the specific nature of human hope as a determinant of behaviour has got relatively little direct attention in empirical psychology until recent times. Even depth-psychology, with its direct focalisation on man's affective life, largely bypassed the specific emotion of hope, in contrast to its constant preoccupation with the emotion of love. This neglect of the hope-theme in life in scientific psychology, physiological, emotional and social, can undoubtedly be traced to the fact that hope is in any case a paradoxical and somewhat baffling subject for the empirical psychologist. In its specific and categorical nature it eludes a strictly empirical grasp, as this is ordinarily understood in the positive sciences. It is a behaviour-pattern, a trait, an attitude, a sentiment, an emotion — depending on the particular psychological point of view from which you consider it — that reaches out to and for a *non-existent* object. It cannot be visualised, conceptualised and analysed except in relation to the non-existent. This poses a problem for the empirical scientist who naturally wants to have the *object* of psychological activity as well as the activity itself right under his eyes. When, therefore, he finds himself confronted by activities of hope in human life and has the task of studying them in empirical terms, his natural tendency will be to focus on aspects of these activities that are concerned with *present* objects. This will be familiar ground to him; but in choosing it for his investigation he will in fact be

bypassing the specific ground of *hope* present in and determining the activity he studies. Hope as a categorical relation to the non-existent will figure only as an indirect or incidental feature of the results of his researches, however valuable they may be as analyses of those aspects of hope which are related to present, existent objects. But these aspects of hope, bearing on here-and-now objects, while they certainly belong to the totality of the hope-syndrome, are not hope itself. In fact with the further relation to the non-existent left out of them they are not hope at all. They automatically turn into other specific psychological activities — love, hate, aggression, fear, anxiety, depression — which more easily admit of investigation and analysis in terms of the here-and-now<sup>1</sup>.

It may be objected to this summary of the position of hope as a theme of empirical psychology that, while it may be true that hope has hitherto got less specific attention than it deserves in empirical research, the reason assigned for this neglect cannot be true. The study of *goals* of human behaviour has for a long time held a major place in the fields of physiological and social psychology — and goals are of their nature as yet in the future and therefore non-existent in relation to the acting subject. As for depth-psychology, Freud himself always emphasised the non-existent character of the object of neurotic anxiety<sup>2</sup>. Empirical psychology *has* in fact taken constant account of the non-existent object present in human psychological activity of various kinds. How then can psychology be accused of a methodological fault to explain its comparative indifference in the past to the specific psychological theme of hope?

A closer analysis of the method of empirical psychology in dealing with non-existent objects will show the inadequacy of this answer to the point made above about the preoccupation of psychology with existent objects. Goals of behaviour have certainly

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<sup>1</sup> On the methodology of psychology cf. C.G. PRATT, *The Logic of Modern Psychology* (New York 1948); J.A. GASSON, *The Concept of « Theory » in Science and in Psychology*, in M.A. ARNOLD and J.A. GASSON, ed., *The Human Person: An Approach to an Integral Theory of Personality* (New York, 1954), pp. 49-80.

<sup>2</sup> « Neurotic anxiety is anxiety in regard to a danger which we do not know » (*The Problem of Anxiety*, chap. 11).

been widely and deeply studied in physiological and social psychology, and depth-psychology has endlessly analysed the presence of the non-existent in human emotional life, not only in connexion with anxiety but in general in connexion with the all-important role of phantasy in psychic life. Strictly, however, most investigations of this kind are not really concerned with the non-existent object as *non-existent* but with ideational or emotional shapes given to it in the psychic life of the subject *here and now*. They bear on the present, actual existence in and for the psyche (or behaviour) of the subject of objects which are, in their objectivity, non-existent for him. Thus goals will be studied in terms of the way in which the subject figures them to himself and in which they determine his behaviour here and now. It is the present psychic existence of the goal that is studied, not its psychic *futurity* for the subject<sup>3</sup>. But the psychic as well as the objective futurity of the goal is an essential, indeed *the* essential, element of any hoping activity<sup>4</sup>. True, this futurity takes *advance* shapes of an ideational or emotional kind in the present, existent life of the subject and these spur him on and sustain him in his pursuit of the desired, non-existent, *hoped-for* goal. But they are not the goal itself in its psychic futurity nor do they constitute the psychic or behavioural pursuit of the objective (but future and therefore non-existent) goal. A truly hopeful man (or group) always knows, and shows that he knows, the difference between the 'presence' that his goal has for him here and now and the futurity that it also, and especially, has for him. What either a man or a group *hopes* for is the goal in its *futurity as object*, so that the hope itself is thereby rendered 'futurist'. The 'futurism' of hope is not merely an inner-psychic experience: it is also a fact of hope-determined behaviour. All purposive and hopeful behaviour

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<sup>3</sup> Psychological studies of the pursuit of the status-goal in social life are concerned with the *impact of the desired goal on life during the pursuit*, not with the dimension of « futurity » in the desire and the pursuit themselves. Cf. V. PACKARD, *The Status Seekers* (New York, 1959).

<sup>4</sup> This is why, once a goal has been attained and thus ceases to have « futurity », it is at once replaced by another goal in still another « future » as the object of hoping activity. This specific quality of hope — that it *must* always *reach out* to but can never *possess* its « future » — is only touched on in goal-psychology, though the findings of this psychology are always illustrating the phenomenon.

is 'futurist': it is directed towards a non-existent object *as* non-existent (but deemed to be capable of attainment). This 'futurism' of the hope-syndrome and of hopeful behaviour points up the clear psychological distinction that exists between hope as *specifically* hope and advance concepts or phantasies or 'models' of the hoped-for object that enter into psychic and behavioural life here and now and that are, in fact, present, existent realities of that life. They are psychically and behaviourally welcomed as 'present' instalments of what, it is hoped, will come, but are in no way confused, except in psychic conditions of neurosis or psychosis, with the hoped-for reality itself. Indeed the confusion that *does* arise in neurotic and psychotic conditions between the 'present' phantasy of a hoped-for object and the hoped-for object itself in its concrete and psychic futurity is quite accurately describable and analysable as a psychic incapacity for hope. The subject is at least temporarily incapacitated from reaching out to and pursuing goals *in their futurity*: he is trapped in their phantastic 'presence' to him here and now and cannot get outside or beyond this. Without the capacity for 'futurist' ideation, emotion and behaviour man is literally 'hopeless', however many features of his present psychic life are linked with non-existent objects (whether these be goals, purposes, phantasies, projections, or anything else). The prevalent weakness of physiological and behavioural psychology in relation to the theme of hope lies precisely in the fact that, while it certainly does study the psychic functioning of non-existent objects in human life, it takes these non-existent objects in *the present, existent reality* which they assume — ideationally, phantastically, emotionally, behaviourally — in psychic life and is thus blocked from taking proper account of the essential 'futurism' of hope. In dealing with the *advance* shapes assumed by the hoped-for object in the *present* psychic life of the subject this kind of psychology has, after all, a present, existent object to work on and can thus remain faithful to an empirical method of investigation originally borrowed from the physical sciences; but the 'futurism' of hope disappears in this methodological process and with it the true psychic reality of hope itself.

Exactly the same methodological criticism applies to the pre-occupation of depth-psychology, especially in its Freudian form,

with the 'presence' in the psyche of non-existent objects. It deals with their psychic *presence*, which is certainly very real and accounts for the phenomenon of cathexis on which Freud threw so much light<sup>5</sup>; but it has little to say about the experience of objects that have to be non-existent, but are still deemed to be capable of coming or being brought into existence, for the experience itself to take place. There is question here of an experience directed towards the object *as future*, not towards such psychic 'presence' as the object may already have in the here-and-now. The experience is essentially 'futurist', not 'presential', though it will of course contain 'presential' psychic elements. Freud illuminated the 'presential' psychic aspect of non-existent objects but not their psychic 'futurism'. Yet the affective 'futurism' of hope — in so far as hope is an affective experience, which it undoubtedly is in part, though not wholly — is, as we have seen, *essential* to the hope-experience as such. If the 'futurist' dimension of the hope-affect is disregarded or played down in it, it ceases to be a specific *hope*-affect. All that we have left of it then is 'presential' psychic elements divorced from their 'futurist' orientation, and it is in fact on these 'presential' elements that depth-psychology mostly focuses, since it too, though in a more empathetic way, shares the methodological inclination taken over by physiological and behavioural psychology from the physical sciences to study present and existent objects, not 'futurist' ones<sup>6</sup>. Freud himself was suspicious of all 'futurism' anyway, seeing it as a wide-open field for the psychic mechanism of irrational projection<sup>7</sup>. He deprecated the holding out of high

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<sup>5</sup> « *Cathexis*. Accumulation of mental energy on some particular idea, memory, or line of thought or action » (J. DREVER, *A Dictionary of Psychology*, revised by H. WALLERSTEIN [London, 1964], p. 35).

<sup>6</sup> On the empathetic method of psychoanalysis cf. K. STERN, *The Third Revolution* (London, 1955), pp. 132 ff. Stern, himself a psychoanalyst, nevertheless adds: « It is the tragedy of psycho-analysis that it was evolved by a nineteenth-century scientist who was very careful to remain what one used to call "scientific". In order to remain scientific, in that sense, you have to exclude anything which is transcendental, in other words, which "goes beyond" *that which is perceived by our senses and can be measured* » (p. 147: italics mine).

<sup>7</sup> Hence his insistence on the « reduction » of « mental life to the (past and present) interplay of reciprocally urging and checking forces » (*Psychogenic Visual Disturbance*, in *Collected Papers*, vol. II).

hopes for humanity<sup>8</sup>, and if his own life was a signal example of hopeful effort in the field of psychological research, sustained through long years of neglect and opposition on the part of academic psychologists, this had its roots in his personal qualities of courage and integrity, not in his psychoanalytic theory which has, actually, very little place for hope<sup>9</sup>.

## II.

If empirical psychology was to come to grips at all with hope in its actual reality as a 'driving' — indeed *the* 'driving' — force in human life, it would have to do so by means of a considerable methodological change. Hope would have to be taken *seriously* as an authentic psychic and behavioural phenomenon, a quite 'normal' and in fact quite necessary factor in human life. This would logically mean taking the 'futurism' of hope seriously, since without its 'futurism' hope would no longer be hope but a composite psychic residue. This in turn would mean giving empirical status to the concept of 'the future' — the non-existent which it is *hoped* to bring into existence or to see coming into existence. How could this be done in a genuinely scientific manner? Traditionally, in psychology as in other empirical sciences 'the future' was regarded as a concept that could only be given scientific status in so far as it could be accurately predicted from empirical facts available here and now. It was deduced from present evidence, not 'hoped for'. Thus astronomers could accurately predict eclipses in the future and the eclipse so predicted, though still in the future, was already a datum of science. It was astrology, not astronomy, to 'hope for' eclipses or any other celestial phenomena. The 'hoped-for' future, whatever else it might be, was not a 'thing' or even a concept that science could take seriously. It would have to be left to poets, social

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<sup>8</sup> « As for the future in general I do not think he spared it much thought. He was so aware of the enormous complexity of both material circumstances and psychological motives that it was a waste of time to speculate on such an unpredictable thing as the future » (E. JONES, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and abridged by L. TRILLING and S. MARCUS [New York, 1961], p. 471).

<sup>9</sup> L. Trilling speaks of « Freud's notion of how a life must be lived: with sternness, fortitude, and honour » (Introduction to E. JONES, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, p. 14).

Utopians, political ideologists, religious believers, and others who dealt in visions and prophecies which might or might not have an element of truth in them but certainly not of a kind amenable to the evidential methods of positive science. The 'hoped-for' future simply did not in any sense exist for science.

Yet all the time the 'hoped-for' future was a 'driving', dynamic, determining force in the actual life of men — including the actual lives of the scientists themselves. Moreover, it was a force of increasing power in the public life of mankind which was now being caught up as never before in history in vast hope-animated projects, political, social, economic and cultural. 'The future', the object of human hope on a fully human scale, was having 'presential' effects that the social psychologist for one would have to reckon with, even if he followed the traditional scientific method of giving serious attention only to the 'presential' social effects of the 'futurist' dream and not taking much account of the 'futurism' of the dream and the hope itself. Marxism in particular forced the psychic importance of the hoped-for future *as future* on the notice of psychologists who were prepared to revise their scientific methodology to cope with the inescapable 'futurism' and the essential and necessary hopefulness of human existence, though the push towards methodological change came from other sources as well. Hope was now seen to be a theme of life that empirical psychology could not avoid and could not reduce to 'presential' elements of psychic life. It would have to be considered, observed and analysed in its own right as the human expectancy and pursuit of the non-existent but (at least ideationally) possible 'future' <sup>10</sup>.

The problem still remained of giving scientific reality to the elusive concept of 'the future' — a non-existent, hoped-for 'future' that could not be regarded as predetermined and predictable in empirical terms of the accepted kind. True, Marxism, side by side with its 'hope', had a determinist theory of 'the future' as well and

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<sup>10</sup> « Since human beings are always living through to the future and its continual possibilities, they are always going beyond themselves and making their worlds. Transcendence and possibility characterize human existence » (H. KOHL, *The Age of Complexity* [New York, 1965], p. 167, explaining the basic insight of Binswanger's « existential analysis »).

offered predictions of the course of history on the basis of it<sup>11</sup>; but outside the ranks of Marxist believers and hopers this theory carried no weight as science. There was no evidential proof of it in the facts available to science here and now. On the contrary the Marxist theory of a predetermined and predictable 'classless' heaven on earth as the culmination of the historical process ran counter to many known facts about the socio-political nature of man<sup>12</sup>. Neither the Marxist 'future' nor any other species of human hoped-for 'future', from the global 'futures' of the political, social, economic and cultural ideologues down to the humble, limited 'futures' envisaged in the everyday social, economic and sexual life of men, could be reduced to the neat category of the empirically verifiable 'future', like the 'future' of eclipses and cometary appearances. The 'future' of hope, whether it was a large-scale or a small-scale hope, was, like hope itself (of which it was the creation), an autonomous kind of reality in human existence — non-existent yet in another way sovereignly existent in its very non-existence. The paradox of this 'future' was a fact of human existence; the paradox of hope was the key-fact of the life of man upon earth. These paradoxes would have to be accepted as empirical realities in their own right, though of a distinctive kind. They would have to be granted scientific existence on their own terms and psychology would have to alter its traditional methodology to bring them within its scopes. The penalty for not doing so would inevitably be the alienation of empirical psychology from what was deepest and most determinant in the actual life of men and its reduction to a science of the *marginalia* of psychic life.

So empirical psychology took to the study of 'futurism' as a normal and necessary dimension of human life, individual and

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<sup>11</sup> Both these aspects of Marxism are ably presented in J. LACROIX, *L'Homme Marxiste*, originally published in *La Vie Intellectuelle*, vol. 15, n. 8-9 (Paris, 1947), pp. 27-59.

<sup>12</sup> Sociological criticism of the Marxist theory of social evolution goes back to G. MOSCA, *Elementi di scienza politica* (1896) and V. PARETO, *Trattato di sociologia generale* (1915-1919). Both show the sociological necessity and inevitability of *élites* in all society, which the Marxist theory of the inevitable historical emergence of a classless society denies.

social. *Homo sperans*<sup>13</sup> became an empirical theme of scientific investigation. His hope was accepted as a fully normal aspect of his being — an aspect without which he would not be man at all. The various forms of his hope could be studied and correlated with other normal aspects of his being, thus opening the way for an analysis of constructive and negative types of the hope-syndrome. Naturally, this approach to human hope and to the hoped-for 'future' towards which it is directed and which it in fact creates and sustains as a positive pole of existence (though itself here and now non-existent), formed part of a new and wider methodological approach to the whole matter of human psychic life. The love-syndrome too came in for a new analysis. Physiological and behaviour psychology studied its concrete, measurable manifestations: depth-psychology studied the interplay of inner-psychic forces that went into it but in a closed psychic field: the new thematic psychology, as we may call it, saw it as an open-ended form of personal and social life, creating *its own* 'world' out of physiological, affective and behavioural materials that offered themselves to its grasp. The 'world' of love *transcended* the materials out of which it was made — or rather, out of which love made its 'world' — just as the 'future' and the whole 'world' of hope transcend the raw materials of every kind out of which hope makes *them*. Thematic psychology *accepted* the human 'worlds' of man — the 'world' of his hope, of his love, of his communion with other men, of his creative work in the human world — analysing them separately and synthesising them in the totality of anthropological experience. Man's 'existence' in love, hope, inter-communion, individual and social creativity, and in all the other themes that combine to make the theme of genuine human life as a totality, here becomes the peak — subject of psychological study — still an empirical study on empirical lines but now unreservedly open to all the breadth and length and height and depth of human experience, paradoxes and all<sup>14</sup>.

It was entirely natural that this fresh approach to human psychic life and to the hope-factor in it in particular should borrow

<sup>13</sup> G. MARCEL's, *Homo viator*: cf. his work of that name (Paris, 1944).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. H. THOMAS, *Persönlichkeit* (Berlin, 1951); P. LERSCH, *Der Aufbau der Person* (Munich, 1951). G.W. ALLPORT'S psychology of «becoming» reaches the same

from the new philosophy of 'existence' which was then in the air in European thought. The philosophy of 'existence' in its various forms was a *philosophy*, springing from and based on processes of reflection on the meaning of common human experience at the phenomenal level; it did not presuppose methods of scientific empirical investigation applied to wide areas of actual psychic life. This latter was the field proper to the empirical psychologist, even when he saw his field in terms of specifically human themes of living. He *found* those themes empirically present in the actual field he studied and in that way stayed within the methodology of his science, though it was now considerably different from what it had been when it had no place for 'futurism'. Still the themes discovered by the empirical psychologist as inherent in and determinant of human life, individual and social, were also to a considerable degree the themes analysed and synthesised by phenomenological and existential thought of a philosophical kind. The psychologist then proceeded to learn from the philosopher with a view to sharpening the tools of his own trade and to reaching more detailed and exact conclusions regarding the functioning of the concrete psychic life of man<sup>15</sup>. This method of perfecting the thematic approach to empirical psychic phenomena had its dangers: the abstractions of the philosopher might now be read into the empirical phenomena themselves, thus isolating the human themes of living from their concrete, scientifically established reality *in* the process of living. The psychologist, in a word, might distort his material in his anxiety to make it fit into the categories of the philosopher, whereas, as an empirical psycho-

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conclusion by a different route (cf. his *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation* [New York, 1937]; *Becoming: Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality* [New Haven, 1960]; *Pattern and Growth in Personality* [New York, 1961]). «Becoming» is also the central theme of C.R. ROGERS' psychology of personality (cf. especially his *On Becoming a Person* [Boston, 1961]).

<sup>15</sup> L. BINSWANGER led the way in this and has since had many followers. See his *The Existential Analysis: School of Thought* in R. MAY *et al.*, ed., *Existence* (New York, 1958). Cf. also A. VAN KAAM, *The Third Force in European Psychology* (Greenwich, Delaware, 1960). The value for empirical psychology of Sartre's «existential psychoanalysis» (Part IV, chap. 2 of *L'Être et le Néant*) is recognised by May. «The central principle of existential psychoanalysis will not be *libido* or *will to power* but the individual's *choice of being*» (Introduction to J.-P. SARTRE, *Existential Psychoanalysis*, trans. H.E. BARNES [New York, 1953]).

logist, he should accept no category of the philosopher that he did not see evidenced beyond question in his material. Freud was similarly caught by the philosophical determinism of the 19th century and read this determinism into all the affective material he studied, which was one of the reasons why there is so little of hope in his psychology. The thematic or, as he came to be called after he began borrowing from the philosophy of 'existence', 'existential' psychologist incurred no such danger. Instead he was exposed to the danger of *overdoing* thematic or 'existential' hope in his empirical work. Hope is, as we have seen, a major, in fact the cardinal, theme of human existence; but it can emerge and develop as a theme only on the basis of innumerable psychic factors of a physiological, affective and social kind, which must never be lost sight of and the existence of which necessitates continuing contributions from physiological, affective and social psychology to thematic or 'existential' psychology.

This inevitable and healthy dependence of hope on given physiological, affective and social conditions of psychic life is in fact underplayed in some presentations of thematic or 'existential' hope, as though hope owed little to its grounds in 'nature' and could well up spontaneously in the 'person' as person <sup>15</sup>. A clear demonstration of the fallacy of this genetic theory of hope is provided by Bowlby's research into infantile depression — the « listless, quiet unhappy, and unresponsive » behaviour-patterns of the « typical separated infant »:

In what conditions, it may be asked, does this develop? In general, it is characteristic of infants who have had a happy relationship with their mothers up till six or nine months and are then suddenly separated from them without an adequate substitute being provided. Of ninety-five children on whom a diagnosis was made, 20 per cent reacted to separation by severe depression, and another 27 per cent by mild depression, making nearly 50 per cent in all. Almost all those with a close and loving relation to their mothers suffered, which means that the depressive response to separation is a normal one at this age. The fact that a majority of those with unhappy relationships escaped indicates that their inner development was already damaged and their later capacity

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<sup>15</sup> Thus A. VAN KAAW, *Religion and Personality* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964) clearly exaggerates the independence of « the spirit » from « social and biological determinism » (p. 105).

for love likely to be impaired.... Some observers believe that after three months of deprivation there is a qualitative change, after which recovery is rarely, if ever, complete<sup>17</sup>.

Bowlby is here considering the damage done to an infant's « capacity for love » by his being deprived of the sheltering, comforting love of his mother at a critical age, and in fact his whole study is concerned with this subject. But it is clear from the detailed evidence he marshals that the damage is not merely done to the child's capacity for *love*: the child's *hope* is also and perhaps chiefly frustrated and broken. The depressed child of his clinical descriptions is above all a *hopeless child*: the deepest psychic wound lies there and the subsequent incapacity for love that shows up in the child's personality is rather a consequence of this than an independent trauma, since, as thematic research into the nature of love has shown, there cannot be love without an ingredient of hope and a condition of total hopelessness incapacitates its victim for love. This diagnosis of the situation is confirmed by what Bowlby says, again on the basis of careful factual research, about the age at which a child ceases « being liable to damage by a lack of maternal care »:

All who have studied the matter would agree that between three and five years the risk is still serious, though much less so than earlier. During this period children no longer live exclusively *in the present*, and can consequently conceive dimly of *a time when their mothers will return*, which is impossible to most children younger than three. Furthermore, the ability to talk permits of simple explanations, and the child will take more readily to understanding mother-substitutes<sup>18</sup>.

In other words, the child after three is capable of ideational 'futurism' and ideational *hope*, which enables him to transcend his being deprived of his mother and to create for himself a new 'world' of hope and consequently of love as well. His « capacity for love » can develop undamaged because the theme of hope in his life has successfully survived the loss of its original but no longer essential object — the 'future' embodied in his mother. It can create and attach itself to a new 'future' now — the 'future' of his mother's

<sup>17</sup> J. BOWLBY, *Child Care and the Growth of Love* (London, 1953), a summary of a report for the World Health Organization on maternal care and mental health, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 29-30: italics mine.

return or the 'future' embodied in an « understanding mother-substitute. » Bowlby generalises too much about love here and elsewhere in his study, not identifying the hope-factor *within* love itself, though it is this factor above all that is destroyed in maternal deprivation and though it is this factor too, surviving deprivation, that enables the older child to make good his losses. But he is excellent in showing that psychophysical conditions antecedent to the emergence of ideational hope in the small child can block *for ever*, or at least impair *for ever*, the later emergence of ideational love and hope in him. The damage to the child's *nature* here proves to be permanently damaging to his *person* in the 'existential' sense.

However, with this caution about never underestimating the psychophysical bases of hope in the human person there must go a clear and strong acknowledgment of the value of thematic analyses of hope, including those that borrow considerably (but wisely, on grounds of adequate empirical evidence) from the philosophy of 'existence'. Such analyses serve to clarify psychophysical processes themselves, as we have just seen in the case of Bowlby's undifferentiated presentation of the psychophysical processes of love in infants. Once we grasp the thematic and 'existential' nature of hope we can trace it back empirically to its pre-ideational foundations in psychophysical life. We can identify pre-ideational hope in infants themselves and not confuse it with general pre-ideational love. This identification has also a therapeutic value, since a practical consequence of it will be the recognition of the importance of giving the maternally deprived infant a pre-ideational 'world' to *hope for*. His need is for a pre-ideational 'future' to constitute him in his human existence and thus make him capable of *hopeful love*, which is really what Bowlby has in mind when he writes of « a close and loving relation » between the child and his mother or mother-substitute.

A caution similar to that entered about the neglect of the psychophysical foundations of hope in a unilateral thematic psychology of hope must also be entered regarding the neglect of the social foundations of hope. Thematic and 'existential' psychology has much to say about interpersonal relationships and 'transparency' in the communion of man with man. Its hopeful human group is characterised by the 'openness' of each one to the other in the

shared but dynamic and flexible pursuit of a common 'project of existence'. Each and all — each *for* all and all *for* each — live in the radiance of a common 'future' which gives 'meaning' to the here-and-now, making it an 'existential' (because future-oriented) 'presence' (to emphasise the personal and interpersonal character of the 'present' so brought into existence by the shared 'futurism' of the group). All other themes of its life, including the love-theme, derive from and have their roots in its hope and in the object of that hope — a 'future' that is as yet non-existent but that shall be brought into existence (the *vita venturi saeculi* of the Christian creed, taken in its anthropological reality which may be independent of and even opposed to the Christian reifications and formulations of the nature of that life). This is the authentic 'world' of personal and interpersonal 'encounter'. Any form of human group-life that falls short of this specifically human 'reality' — a 'reality' that postulates as its foundation the non-existent but realisable 'future' — reduces man both as an individual and as a social being to an 'object of nature' bereft of a human 'future' and of human hope, and therefore depersonalised and dehumanised from the start<sup>19</sup>.

This is certainly a profound and exact analysis of the nature of genuinely personal and interpersonal group-life. But group-life in this sense can only grow out of humbler forms of psychosocial life which are largely pre-personal in character. Every individual human life has in any case to begin at a pre-personal psychosocial level — that of psychosocial infancy. For the understanding of this we have to depend on social psychology, which is the psychology of social processes of living regardless of whether they are strictly personal or not — and many of them, as the evidence shows, always remain subpersonal even in highly personalised individuals and groups<sup>20</sup>. If thematic and 'existential' social psychology neglects the pre-personal and subpersonal substratum of personal and interpersonal life and holds itself aloof from general social psychology (the science of man's psychosocial 'nature'), it

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. R.C. KWANT, *Encounter* (Pittsburgh, 1960); J.H. VAN DEN BERG, *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry*, chap. 3, « Historical Survey, Summary Discussion of Phenomenological Literature » (Oxford, 1955).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. W. J. H. SPROTT, *Human Groups* (London, 1958).

does so at its peril. Whether they like it or not persons have 'natures' and 'natures' take their revenge in all kinds of ways, overt and subterranean, when persons do not give them due recognition and attention — as Freud pointed out when he wrote of the kickbacks against the Ego that repressed sexuality knows well how to deliver. Thematic psychology is right in insisting on the human person's transcendence of 'nature'; but if it is to be a healthy and constructive transcendence, it must 'assume' and integrate 'nature' into the themes of living that constitute the specifically human 'world' of being. Otherwise thematic living itself will be constantly menaced and may well be undermined by irruptions and eruptions from the non-integrated (or 'existentially repressed') 'world' of 'nature', as is evidenced by the history of purely thematic experiments in living, ancient as well as modern. When 'futurism' becomes isolated from 'presentiality', except in so far as it creates its own future-oriented 'presentiality', and from the human historicity that underlies 'presentiality' itself, linking it to the human historical past, it can easily become narrow and fanatical. 'Enthusiasm', milleniarism, apocalypticism — these and similar thematic and 'existential' deviations are the fruit of pure 'futurism' and of discarnate hope<sup>21</sup>.

There is no solid substance and therefore no future in such 'futurism': it either disintegrates from within, leaving disappointment and bitterness in its train, or it intensifies itself to the point of 'existential' psychosis and dies in the conflicts generated, either within itself or with the 'world' of 'nature' outside the 'futurist' ranks, by the totally future-oriented 'presentiality' which it creates for the purposes of day-to-day living. We thus come up against another paradox of human 'futurism' and hope. Hope creates the human present (or 'presence'); but it can only do this sanely and constructively if it works on and respects the already given 'presentiality' of human 'nature' and of human history. Past, present and future are *all* in their different ways constituents of human 'existence'. Memory of the past, experience of the present, hope for the future: 'existence' contains and synthesises them all.

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<sup>21</sup> On this see R.A. KNOX, *Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History of Religion, with Special Reference to the XVII and XVIII Centuries* (Oxford, 1950).

Thematic psychology rightly makes hope the 'projective' force that transforms memory of the past and experience of the present into « originality of life, expression, and behavior »<sup>22</sup> for individual human persons and interpersonal groups; but memory of the past and experience of the present exist as given realities in their own right *prior* to the transformative action wrought on them by 'projective' hope, and this fact, which is of vital importance for the constructive functioning of hope itself, renders it all the more necessary for thematic psychology to keep itself open to continual inner enrichment from forms of empirical psychology that focus on the elements of memory and experience in human psychic life. At the same time thematic psychology throws constant light from the angle of *personal* life in the individual and of *interpersonal* life in human groups on psychic processes of memory and experience that prepare the way for personal and interpersonal life, that always accompany these, and that have to be harmonised with and integrated into them if they are to have the quality of genuine *human* « originality » and are not to become arbitrary, anarchical, 'unnatural' — which would only be to arrive at depersonalisation by another route. Physiological, behavioural, affective and social psychology: the psychology of thinking: all kinds of psychology, in short, that deal with the 'presentiality' of human life — thematic psychology can go over the material brought to light by them all and trace the gradual emergence in it of the hope-theme and other themes of strictly personal and interpersonal life. In the same way it can go over the frustrations and distortions of psychic life described and analysed in detail by such forms of empirical psychology and see them as blocks and hindrances to the emergence and development of authentic hope, love, faith, confidence, courage and other themes of personal living, as we saw above when we took a thematic standpoint in regard to Bowlby's findings about the consequences of maternal deprivation in children.

A well-balanced psychology of hope must, then, consider it from all angles and in all its elements, including those that do not show up directly at the thematic level. Hope is a *form*, indeed *the*

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<sup>22</sup> A. VAN KAAM, *Religion and Personality*, p. 49.

form, of human living. It enters into all human living; but all human living, in turn, enters into it. The psychology of hope is in fact extremely complex and there are no short cuts through it. Short-cut conceptions of human hope and short-cut action based on them may solve some immediate problems of human immersion in 'presentiality', but they leave other problems untouched and may well add new problems to them — a point abundantly exemplified in case-histories, both individual and social. For a social example one has only to consider what actually happened to the Marxist hope when it gained ascendancy in the lives of millions of men. It violated the humanity in whose name it created and strove for its particular kind of 'future', forcing Marxist humanists to adopt a 'revision' both of the hope itself and of the 'future' which is its object<sup>23</sup>. Short-cut psychologies of hope run into the same impasse. They point to one 'existential' way forward through the confusion of life — only to find that 'existence' must after all come to terms with 'nature' or else perish. An integral psychology of hope must find roots for hope in the whole of psychic life — in its 'futurism' to begin with, certainly, but also in its 'presentiality' and historicity. Yet the *primacy* of 'futurism' in hope must always be sustained in the psychology as well as in the philosophy and theology of hope, since the *primary* roots of hope are always in the realm of the possible and desirable 'future', not in that of the actual present or of the once-upon-a-time but no longer actual past. Human hope and the human 'future' are so necessarily and inextricably intertwined that they cannot even for a moment be separated without eliminating hope, and therefore humanity, from man.

### III.

The relation of the psychology to the theology of hope are manifold. Here I will only attempt to indicate three of them briefly:

1) The *elpis* (hope) of the New Testament is the fulness of « the hope of Israel » (Acts 28, 20). It is a divine gift, as was « the

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. E. Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt, 1959).

hope of Israel » in the Old Covenant. But equally it is a *human* hope, a grace of the Holy Spirit incarnate in the hopefulness of men. Man hopes divinely but at the same time fully humanly when he has *elpis*. It is a new and divinely actuated form of the hope-theme in his life, individual and social: it is *not* a totally other kind of hope-theme, somehow inserted into him apart from his ordinary human capacity for hope. There is even clinical proof of this. Acute and intense depression or affective loss of hope in a Christian man, which is a pathological condition of his human psyche, affects him in the sphere of *elpis* also. He 'despairs', affectively speaking: hope in God 'means' nothing to him any more. Not being able to hope any more in ordinary human terms, he cannot hope in terms of *elpis* either. On the other hand, when under psychotherapy or even chemotherapy hopefulness returns to his psyche, *elpis* returns along with it. The hope-theme is substantially one in his psychic life all the time, his *elpis* being simply the supreme form of it. This is not to reduce *elpis* to general human hopefulness but simply to point out that it is a Spirit-activated kind of human hopefulness. Because of this fact the psychology of hope has a direct relevance for the theology of hope. It illuminates *all that is human* in *elpis*, which is a vast amount of it. A theology of hope which did not 'assume' and integrate into itself all that we can learn about hope from the empirical study of it would necessarily be incomplete. This is particularly true of the moral and pastoral theology of hope.

2) The 'future' which constitutes the object of hope has to be a *human* 'future' — a 'future into which a man can 'project' himself *as man*. A non-human 'future' — a 'future' to which man cannot relate himself *anthropologically* — cannot constitute an object of real hope. In hope man transcends his 'presentiality' in the name of and for the sake of his 'futurity' — but precisely because it is in his 'futurity' that he discerns the possibility for himself of being 'more man'. The *elpis* of the New Testament is faithful to this requirement of the hope-theme in human life. Its object is *the risen life*, « the redemption of our bodies » of which we already have « the first fruits » here and now (Rom. 8, 23). This 'future' and the 'presentiality' (« the first fruits ») which it creates in us

here and now through the power of the Risen Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit are indeed gifts of God; but they are truly *human* realities as well. The 'future' of New Testament *elpis* is a genuinely anthropological 'future'. The same can *not* be said of the kind of 'future' offered to the hope of man in post-scholastic theology. Man could not relate himself *as man* to that kind of 'future'. It postulated some kind of being other than man, and in fact it was presented as a 'future' for what was called his 'soul'. This non-anthropological theology of hope struck at the roots of real hope in man. It left him, *as man*, psychically 'hopeless'. This insight into post-scholastic theology, which comes from studying it anew in the light of the psychology of hope, provides a fresh clue to the meaning of the process of dechristianisation. This is generally assumed to mean a gradual process of loss of *faith* in once-Christian peoples. It would surely be more accurate to see it as a gradual process of loss of *elpis* in them. The 'future' offered to them in Christian preaching as the object of their hope ceased to have anthropological reality for them — and so ceased to have theological reality also. Meanwhile other and seemingly much better 'futures' were opening out before them and becoming focuses of the hope-theme in their lives. In these psychological circumstances the choice they made between 'futures' was understandable and indeed inevitable. They exchanged the abstract 'heaven' of current Church teaching for secular 'futures' that beckoned to them *as men*.

3) The present-day renewal of the theology of hope in the Church, of which other articles in this volume have much to say, is still too much focused, from the psychological point of view, on the subjective character and quality of *elpis*. This has now been well restored to its true locus in the thematic and 'existential' life of man. It is also true that *elpis* is assigned its true object in contemporary theology — the *eschaton* of the resurrection, already partially present to redeemed man in the here-and-now. But the 'future' of Christian hope — that 'future' as a 'future' *for men today* — is still lacking in anthropological substance. The concepts of biblical anthropology will not, as such, suffice here since they are tied to a historical human *past* and our need is for '*futurist*'

concepts. We need to take the basic 'futurism' of biblical theology and reconceptualise it in contemporary 'futurist' terms. This was just what Teilhard de Chardin did, and whatever may be thought of his particular brand of 'futurism' it was at least a courageous and heartening effort in the right direction.

*Gaudium et spes* was Vatican II's contribution to the renewal of the theology of hope and to the theological construction of a 'future' for modern man. Psychologically it has many satisfying features<sup>24</sup>; but again it is better on the subjective nature and force of *elpis* than in its projection of a theological and anthropological 'future' for the Church and the world of today. Past and present loom larger in its thoughts than the 'future' *as future*. The memory-element in its meditation on human existence is strong and there is strength too in the experience of the present contained in it; but its *thrust* towards the future is relatively weak, though it has many 'futurist' indications that could be combined to form a thrustful 'futurist' theology. Theological 'futurism' in the post-conciliar age is spread over many fields and is quite thrustful in some of them — Dutch theology being outstanding in this respect<sup>25</sup>. The influence of 'existential' philosophy and psychology is evident in all theology of this kind; but so far it has not profited adequately by psychological research into the physiological, behavioural, affective, social and cognitive elements of human psychic life. The dangers of this neglect of 'nature' in man have been stressed in the present article. 'Nature' without 'personality' is hopeless, but 'personality' divorced from 'nature' ends up by being hopeless too. An adequate 'futurist' theology for our time must, at a higher level, reproduce the characteristics of an adequate psychology of

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. my article *The Second Vatican Council's Psychology of Personal and Social Life*, *Studia Moralia* IV (1966), pp. 167-191, republished as *Psychologie de la vie personnelle et sociale selon le Second Concile du Vatican* in J. DE LA TORRE et al., *Eglise et Communauté Humaine* (Paris, 1968), pp. 107-131.

<sup>25</sup> The « newness » of Christian life that must ever be renewed is a significant theme of « futurist » theology. « In the following pages we hope to present anew to adults the message which Jesus of Nazareth brought into the world, *to make it sound as new as it is* » (*De Nieuwe Katechismus*, English trans. *A New Catechism* [London, 1967], p. V: Foreword of the Bishops of the Netherlands: italics mine). This corresponds on the theological plane to the « newness » or « revolution » of life that « existential » hope holds itself « ready » for (cf. E. FROMM, *The Revolution of Hope* [New York, 1968]).

hope. It must reckon with man's rootedness in nature, history and 'presentiality' precisely in order to offer him a truly human 'future', and at the same time it must never become so tied to nature, history and 'presentiality' as to fail in its *essential* task of offering man a saving 'future' to which he can respond in saving hope.

Rome, Academia Alfonsiana